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COMMITMENT TO EMPLOYEES, LABOR INTENSITY, AND LABOR 
PRODUCTIVITY IN SMALL FIRMS: A NON-LINEAR APPROACH 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential existence of a concave 
downward curve between Organizational Commitment to Employees (OCE) and labor 
productivity in small firms. The moderating effects of labor intensity on this curvilinear 
relationship are also examined.  
Design/methodology/approach - We use a sample of 819 manufacturing small firms from 
the Spanish Ministry of Industry and Energy’s Survey on Business Strategies, and apply 
hierarchical regression analysis to test our hypotheses. 
Findings – The results support a non-linear association between OCE investments and labor 
productivity: the higher the level of OCE, the lower its positive impact on organizational 
outcomes will be. Our results also support the contingent view of strategic human resource 
management, so that an investment in OCE is more effective in some contexts than in others. 
Practical implications - We conclude that managers and investors should be aware of the 
fact that investments in OCE are not always correspondingly beneficial. In the small firm 
setting, not all firms with large profits apply OCE. A high level of OCE investment may be 
counterproductive. 
Originality/value - The strategic human resource management literature usually assumes a 
linear relationship between OCE and organizational outcomes; very few empirical studies 
have considered a nonlinear approach. 
Keywords - Commitment to employees, curvilinear relationship, labor intensity, 
organizational outcomes, small firms. 
Paper type - Research paper. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Numerous studies in the strategic human resource management literature have 
analyzed the high-commitment management model (e.g., Arthur, 1994), high-performance 
work systems (e.g., Huselid, 1995) or the organizational commitment to employees (OCE) 
model (e.g., Lee & Miller, 1999). These terms are used to denote a system of human resource 
practices that enhance employees’ skills and knowledge, their commitment, and consequently, 
their labor productivity, thereby turning them into a source of competitive advantage for firms. 
This study focuses primarily on the investment aspect of OCE. Companies committed to their 
employees typically invest more than similar firms in progressive human resource practices 
such as education and training, good working conditions, and in the total package of 
compensation (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Miller & Lee, 2001). Quantifying investments is 
useful in that it allows investors and other outside actors to analyze and understand the OCE 
model, about which they often have only poor, piecemeal information (d’Arcimoles, 1997).  
At the organizational level of analysis, most empirical studies of progressive human 
resource practices have shown that these can lead to better organizational outcomes. However, 
these studies have centered on large firms. A growing number of researchers (e.g., Hayton, 
2003; Storey, 2002) have identified the need for similar research in small firms. These authors 
argue that because small firms are not simply “scaled-down” versions of large firms, human 
resource practices that are effective in large firms may not automatically work in small firms. 
In this vein, Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Godard (2004) argue that although investment 
in progressive human resource practices generates substantial benefits, it also involves costs, 
which are particularly significant in small firms (Sels et al., 2006; Way, 2002). The same 
authors also state that these costs offset the benefits, and may even outweigh them, which 
may imply that OCE has a negative effect on organizational outcomes. Consequently, 
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managers of small firms face a key question: are human resource practices and organizational 
outcomes positively or negatively associated? The few empirical studies that have examined 
this issue provide contradictory results (e.g., Sels et al., 2006; Storey, 2002; Way, 2002), 
which prompted Muse et al. (2005) to call for additional empirical studies to help clarify the 
exact nature of the relationship between OCE and organizational outcomes in small firms.     
In this respect, Aiken and West (1991) and Barnett and Salomon (2006) note that 
when opposing theoretical proposals forecast relationships where two variables have different 
signs, and when empirical studies produce mixed results, the possibility should be considered 
that the relationship between these two variables might be curvilinear (i.e. nonlinear). In this 
case, a point of inflection (maximum and minimum of the curve) is seen where the change of 
sign occurs, and therefore a negative relationship can coexist with a positive relationship.  
Although some researchers have shown that the relationship between human resource 
practices and organizational outcomes can be nonlinear (e.g., Becker et al, 1997; Chadwick, 
2007; Chi & Lin, 2010), most scholars still adopt a linear relationship. By adopting a 
nonlinear approach in this paper, we propose that the significant costs generated in small 
firms cause a curvilinear relationship between OCE investments and organizational outcomes 
in that the higher the level of OCE, the lower its positive impact on organizational outcomes 
will be, to the point that it may become negative. Previous studies have not yet examined the 
potential existence of a curvilinear relationship in the small firm setting. The main purpose of 
this study is to bridge this gap.  
In addition, Boxall and Purcell (2000), Datta et al. (2005) and Way (2002) indicate 
that progressive human resource practices will be more beneficial in high labor intensive 
contexts. The positive performance deriving from these practices is more likely to occur in 
contexts in which the employees, rather than equipment or technology, add value to the 
product or service offered. In this study, we propose that OCE investments and labor intensity 
 4 
interact positively, and organizational outcomes increase as a result. Previous empirical 
studies have not examined the possibility that labor intensity may be acting as a moderator 
variable in the relationship between OCE and organizational outcomes in small firms. Prior 
studies only consider labor intensity as a control variable (e.g., Sels et al., 2006; Way, 2002), 
which prevents them from analyzing whether small firms with high and low labor intensity 
require different (or similar) levels of OCE. This is the second objective of our research.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF OCE 
OCE is a multifaceted concept because an organization can exhibit commitment to its 
employees in many ways. From a psychological approach, OCE may be regarded as a process 
of social exchange between managers and employees designed to create a facilitative climate 
of organizational support, trust and helpfulness (e.g., Eisenberger, et al., 1986; Wayne et al., 
1997). When employees realize that their organization takes their needs into account and pays 
attention to their observations, those employees are far more likely to develop positive 
affective attachments to their employer. OCE is expected to create useful emotional bonds 
between an organization and its employees. From a management approach, OCE may be 
reflected by factors such as a company’s care for its employees’ well being and satisfaction, 
ensuring good working conditions, and in its investment in training and competitive 
compensation (Lee & Miller, 1999; Miller & Lee, 2001; Muse et al., 2005). These aspects of 
OCE will be critical to enlisting employees’ best efforts and dedication at work. 
The logical connection between OCE and benefits to the organization is supported by 
research from scholars such as Miller and Lee (2001) and Muse et al., (2005). These authors 
base their reasoning on both the human capital theory and the resource-based theory to argue 
that investment in OCE contributes to building a human capital pool and to stimulating a 
social climate of mutual commitment between the firm and its employees. In economic terms, 
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such factors are valuable, scarce and difficult to imitate. The initiatives and investments 
designed to improve the firm’s human capital represent a highly significant competitive 
advantage since they help the firm build up a specialized work force which constitutes an 
inimitable asset. Likewise, firm investments oriented toward encouraging employee 
commitment are a source of competitive advantage since the greater employee collaboration, 
the higher their labor productivity will be. This situation leads to increased creativity and 
organizational learning capacity, which in turn will allow innovation and the capacity to 
respond effectively to increased competitive intensity in today’s markets. Furthermore, this 
social climate of mutual commitment is supported within a network of social relationships 
that are not easy to identify and are therefore difficult to imitate.  
Despite these benefits and the apparent evidence supporting the implementation of 
OCE, not all researchers appear to be entirely convinced. For example, Godard (2004), Guest 
et al. (2003) and Cappelli and Neumark (2001) maintain that the usefulness of progressive 
human resource practices is overrated because certain costs involved in its implementation 
have not been taken into account. OCE has a “dark side” which negatively affects 
organizational outcomes. In this respect, Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Youndt et al. 
(1996) note that although greater investment in progressive human resource practices is likely 
to lead to higher income, at the same time it undoubtedly increases labor costs and, therefore, 
the net effect on organizational outcomes is uncertain. This argument is particularly valid in 
relation to the higher salaries required by OCE implementation. Likewise, increasing 
employees’ job security may prove relatively costly, especially for firms facing highly 
fluctuating product demands or operating in relatively rigid labor markets with high dismissal 
costs (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2001; Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2007). Cappelli and Neumark (2001) 
provide empirical evidence that OCE increases sales per employee but, at the same time, 
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because of the magnitude of the labor costs involved, no positive effect of OCE is noted on 
sales per unit of labor cost. 
The above benefits (pros) and costs (cons) may be extrapolated to small firms (Sels et 
al., 2006). On the benefits side, authors like Mayson and Barret (2006), Muse et al. (2005) 
and Way (2002) stress that the ability to adequately provide qualified employees with 
effective training, secure jobs, and offer competitive compensation are key factors in 
achieving competitive success in small firms. This means that employees’ knowledge, skills 
and motivation, encouraged by investments in OCE, become a strategic asset—valuable, rare 
and inimitable—and a source of sustainable competitive advantage for small firms. With 
regard to OCE costs, Baron and Kreps (1999) state that OCE involves a lot of hard work for 
small firms because it requires constant attention and investments that can add to 
organizational overheads. Several researchers pay particular attention to OCE costs in small 
firms. Godard and Delaney (2000) demonstrate that OCE implementation is actually difficult 
and is a major concern for small firms since it involves high labor costs, which in economic 
terms are only feasible in large firms that are able to spread the costs effectively. This opinion 
is shared by Sels et al. (2006) and Way (2002), who argue that the costs of investing in OCE 
probably outweigh the benefits it brings to small firms, since they cannot exploit economies 
of scale to the same extent as large firms.  
In addition, small firms have to bear other costs that extend the “dark side” of OCE, 
and consequently, enhance the negative effect of OCE on organizational outcomes. Mayson 
and Barret (2006) indicate that despite the view that one of the great strengths of small firms 
is their informal human resource practices, this informality can lead to diminishing returns. 
Poor planning often leads to a lack of coordination among the different human resource 
practices and hinders the consideration of employees as a valuable asset. In this respect, 
Wood (1995) emphasizes that firms should be successful in implementing OCE when the 
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human resource management function is “taken seriously”, that is, when the firm has clear 
objectives to meet and has integrated OCE investments into its established financial program. 
Another drawback is that many small firms offer their products and services in a local market, 
which means their options for increasing sales by investing in OCE are very limited (De Grip 
& Sieben, 2006). A stronger investment in OCE will not increase organizational outcomes 
because the limited scope of the market they cover restricts any chances of increasing sales. 
The most feasible alternative for small firms to increase their labor productivity is to reduce 
the number of employees or their labor costs, which weakens motivation among employees, 
and consequently the potentially positive effect that OCE may have on organizational results.  
These increased costs have prompted some researchers to suggest explicitly that the 
conventional positive relationship between OCE and organizational outcomes is less likely to 
arise in small firms. The few empirical studies carried out in small firms offer contradictory 
results. For example, Storey (2002) supports the traditional theory that implementing OCE 
has a positive impact on organizational outcomes, although they conclude that this positive 
effect is relatively weaker in small firms. Other studies such as those by De Grip and Sieben 
(2006) and Way (2002) conclude that OCE has no significant effect on organizational 
outcomes. In particular, Way (2002) reveals that the sales improvements resulting from OCE 
are offset by the increased labor costs derived from their implementation. Finally, Sels et al. 
(2006) use different indicators of organizational outcomes and reach the conclusion that OCE 
may have positive and negative impacts on organizational outcomes. These authors show that 
while OCE increases the ratio of value added to hours worked, the extent of the labor costs 
incurred produces a negative effect that significantly reduces the ratio of value added to labor 
costs.  
In summary, while some studies show a positive effect, others find a negative effect, 
and yet others conclude that OCE has no significant effect whatsoever on organizational 
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results. If we follow the arguments of Aiken and West (1991) and Barnett and Salomon (2006) 
in the OCE theoretical framework, we may conclude that the origin of these discrepancies lies 
in the existence of a curvilinear relationship between OCE and organizational outcomes in 
small firms. In other words, the effect of OCE on organizational outcomes is different at 
different levels of OCE. Chadwick (2007) supports this proposal when he maintains that a 
standard assumption in organizational performance modeling is that the marginal utility of 
investments in organizational assets drops once a certain level has been reached. This notion 
of decreasing marginal returns implies that the positive effect of OCE investments falls as the 
level of OCE increases, and eventually may become negative when OCE is implemented 
extensively, if the costs of additional OCE investments exceed the benefits they generate. A 
drop in marginal utility may occur if employers first utilize the most effective types of human 
resource activities included in OCE (Chadwick, 2007). He illustrates this by explaining how 
investments in training may lead to decreasing returns if decision makers initially choose the 
type of training that has the biggest impact on organizational outcomes.  
Similarly, Chi and Lin (2010) argue that an additional investment in OCE made at a 
high implementation level produces a slight or null marginal utility given the significant 
magnitude of the associated labor costs. In short, the effect of OCE on organizational 
outcomes will be more positive in a low level than a high level implementation context. This 
curvilinear proposal is more likely to be seen in small firms as a result of the high costs 
involved in implementing OCE. Kotey and Slade (2005) also follow this line in 
recommending small firms to maintain a certain balance when setting up OCE so as to reach 
an intermediate implementation level and thereby take full advantage of the benefits without 
incurring excessive costs. Consequently, we adopt a nonlinear perspective in the relationship 
between OCE and organizational outcomes in small firms to propose:  
 9 
Hypothesis 1. OCE and organizational outcomes have a concave downward 
curvilinear relationship. 
The moderator role of labor intensity  
The benefits and costs associated with OCE may vary depending on conditions that 
differ from one firm to another (Godard, 2004). In this respect, Youndt et al. (1996) also 
postulate that OCE must be integrated into the production process if the firm is to take full 
advantage of its potential. Specifically, the level of labor intensity is an important variable 
that can moderate the effect of OCE on organizational results (Datta et al., 2005; Godard, 
2004; Guest et al., 2003). Labor intensity may be defined as the ratio of labor costs to the 
value of the firm’s plant and manufacturing equipment. A high degree of labor intensity 
implies relatively lower plant and machinery costs relative to staffing expenses. Specifically, 
OCE offers more benefits in a context of high labor intensity (Datta et al., 2005). A less labor-
intensive firm, characterized by a mechanized production system, offers few opportunities to 
its employees to improve their labor productivity levels through greater commitment and 
dedication in their jobs. Conversely, labor intensive production systems provide employees 
with more opportunities to make suggestions and innovations. Terpstra and Rozzell (1993) 
note that less labor intensive firms cannot take full advantage of their workers’ skills and 
knowledge because of their highly automated production systems. Thus, workers in more 
labor intensive firms play a greater role in the production process. In this more labor intensive 
context, employees are an especially valuable strategic asset which proves difficult to 
substitute (Boxall & Purcell, 2000; Way, 2002). Youndt et al. (1996) also maintain that the 
higher the potential for employee contribution in a firm, the more likely the firm will be to 
invest in OCE, and that this investment will lead to higher individual productivity and firm 
performance. When labor costs represent a larger share of total expenses, firms might 
anticipate greater benefit from their OCE investment. Furthermore, Youndt et al. (1996) 
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recognize that implementing OCE in a context of low labor intensity may even have a 
negative impact on organizational outcomes. According to these authors, the technological 
advances and automated production systems in place in most industrial companies require 
employees with few qualifications who earn relatively lower salaries. OCE investment costs 
are rarely justified in such contexts since the benefits they bring tend to be of limited utility. 
Based on this argument, a firm with a low level of OCE may be more effective if it is less 
labor intensive. In sum, if we adopt a global perspective that considers both the firm’s level of 
OCE and its degree of labor intensity, we would expect that the higher the OCE level and the 
lower the labor intensity, the lower the positive effect of the OCE investments will be on 
organizational outcomes. Consequently, we posit:  
Hypothesis 2. OCE and labor intensity interact in predicting organizational 
outcomes: the concave downward curvilinear relationship between OCE and 
organizational outcomes is stronger when labor intensity is high.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Our research was carried out on a sample of Spanish firms. If one is looking for a 
country in which to analyze OCE in small firms, Spain provides a representative case study. 
The Spanish economy is dominated by small firms, with fifty-five per cent of the labor force 
employed in companies with no more than 100 employees (Rigby & Lawlor, 2001). Studies 
on the Spanish workplace indicate that the set of practices associated with the OCE model are 
seldom encountered in practice and their incidence has not increased very much in recent 
years. Some systemic factors account for this, including “short term” human resource 
management and adversarial industrial relations traditions. In Spain it is very difficult to 
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convince small firm managers of the longer-term investment arguments for expenditure on 
employees’ well being (Rigby & Lawlor, 2001). 
The data to empirically test our theoretical hypotheses come from the Survey on 
Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE). Financed by the 
Spanish Ministry of Industry and Energy, the SEPI Foundation is responsible for the Survey’s 
design and administration through the Economic Research Program. The ESEE complements 
the information from two essential statistical sources that have traditionally been available for 
analyzing Spanish industry: the Industrial Survey published by the Spanish National Statistics 
Institute, and the Bank of Spain’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office. The ESEE reference 
population consists of firms with 10 or more workers in manufacturing industries, excluding 
industrial activities related to oil refining and the treatment of fuels. We use data from 2002 
since this was the most recent full survey at the time of our study. Given the wide variations 
in the definition of a small firm according to country or geographical area (Mayson & Barret, 
2006), we used the criterion proposed by Sels et al. (2006) and Way (2002): firms with a 
maximum of 100 employees, thus enabling comparisons of our results with those of previous 
studies. Our final sample included 819 small firms. Table 1 shows distribution by sector using 
the Spanish National Classification of Business Activity (Clasificación Nacional de 
Actividades Económicas ‘CNAE’) and the Standard Industrial Classification system (SIC). 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 
------------------------ 
Measures    
Control variables. Following previous research (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Muse et al., 
2005), we included five control variables: firm age, firm size, share capital held by other firms, 
sector of activity and innovation intensity. Firm age was calculated as the number of years 
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from the company’s foundation to the time of the survey. Firm size was defined as the 
logarithm of the number of employees. The third control variable was defined as the 
percentage of share capital held by another firm. The industrial sector was based on the 
CNAE classification. Finally, innovation intensity was calculated as the percentage 
coefficient between R&D spending and the firm’s sales.  
Independent variables. We used Schmenner’s (1986) measure of labor intensity: the 
ratio of labor costs to the firm’s total net fixed assets. Following Lee and Miller (1999) and 
Muse et al., (2005), we used an aggregated index of various human resource practices that 
configure OCE on the system level. As Chadwick (2010) notes, the most common 
multivariate methodology for operationalizing human resource practices on the system level 
is also simple: the additive index. An additive index focuses on bundles of human resource 
management practices and reflects their sinergistic nature. Additive indices allow researchers 
to determine the aggregated effects of a group of variables without assuming that significant 
interactions occur amongst the component variables (Chadwick, 2010). This method is 
particularly suitable in small firms since in this setting, individual practices examined in 
isolation are not likely to have much influence on organizational outcomes (Drummong & 
Stone, 2007; Storey, 2002). We calculated this index as the mean of the standardized scores of 
three equally weighted variables: compensation per employee, training expenditures and 
proportion of permanent employees.  
Similarly to Muse et al., (2005), compensation per employee was calculated as the 
ratio of labor costs to the total number of employees. In Spain, labor costs include wages and 
salaries, compensation fees, national insurance contributions, pension scheme payments and 
other social expenditures. Muse et al., (2005) state that their measure is similar to that of the 
study by Lee and Miller (1999), who used two 5 point Likert scales asking CEOs to rate their 
organizations on OCE. The first one (OCE1) covers the employees’ overall satisfaction at 
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work and well-being, and the second one (OCE2) covers total dollars invested in employee 
compensation and in training and development. The two scales clearly measured different 
aspects of the commitment to employees construct (Lee & Miller, 1999; Miller & Lee, 2001). 
We therefore consider it appropriate to introduce a further two indicators that complement the 
employee’s compensation factor. These are, firstly, the ratio of training expenditures to total 
number of employees as an indicator of the organization’s investment in training and 
development of their employees; and secondly, the proportion of workers without temporary 
contracts as a measure of job security. Temporary employment has been suggested as an 
indicator of objective operationalization of job insecurity (De Witte & Näswall, 2003; Pearce, 
1998). This could be important, because there has been extensive research showing that job 
insecurity is associated with a range of negative outcomes affecting satisfaction at work and 
employees’ well-being (Guest, 2004). This is particularly true in the Spanish context. Most 
temporary employees contracted by Spanish firms typically have a lower educational level, 
precarious job position, and are clearly involuntary (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2001; Rodríguez-
Gutiérrez, 2007). These aspects indicate that, in Spain, temporary work contracts are 
characterized by higher job insecurity and poorer working conditions than those of permanent 
work contracts (Caballer et al., 2005; Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2007). 
Dependent variables. Datta et al. (2005) and Muse et al., (2005) advocate focusing on 
labor productivity to assess organizational outcomes because it indicates the extent to which 
employees are efficiently creating output and isolates them to a certain extent from external 
variations in capital and product markets. Consequently, it allows comparison of 
organizational outcomes among different industries. This is highly advisable when, as in our 
case, an intersectoral sample of firms is being used. As in previous studies (e.g., Muse et al., 
2005), we use the logarithm of the ratio of sales to employees as a measure of labor 
productivity. Nonetheless, this measure has a critical limitation: it does not include the OCE 
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implementation-related labor costs and, therefore, the positive effect that OCE has on labor 
productivity may be overestimated (Cappelli & Neumark, 2001; Way, 2002). In order to 
overcome this limitation, we also used the measure of labor productivity proposed by Way 
(2002), namely the logarithm of the ratio of sales to labor costs.   
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations between the study variables. 
We followed Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations in examining our theoretical 
hypotheses. This involved centering the independent variables to avoid multicollinearity 
problems between the interaction terms and the variables that constitute them. We used a 
hierarchical regression analysis to select the model which best accounts for labor productivity 
and to test the hypotheses. In the left-hand panel of Table 3, the regression analysis results are 
shown when sales per employee is the dependent variable. The significant difference in 
explained variance between Models 1 and 2 confirms a curvilinear relationship. In Model 2, 
OCE are significantly and positively related to sales per employee (b = 0.432) and the squared 
OCE variable is significantly and negatively related to sales per employee (b = –0.114). We 
provide empirical evidence for a concave downward curve between OCE and sales per 
employee, thus confirming Hypothesis 1. In particular, using Aiken and West’s (1991) 
terminology, there is a predominantly positive concave downward curvilinear relationship 
between these variables. However, Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed because the introduction of 
the interactions between OCE and labor intensity into Model 3 does not lead to a significant 
increase in the explained variance from Model 2. The higher order interaction involving the 
quadratic OCE variable is not significantly related to sales per employee (b = –0.010). In 
short, Model 2 best explains sales per employee.  
------------------------ 
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Insert Table 2 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 
------------------------ 
The right-hand panel in Table 3 shows the regression results when sales per unit of 
labor costs is the dependent variable. The results do not confirm Hypothesis 1, as the squared 
OCE
 
term in Model 2 is not significantly related to sales per unit of labor costs (b = 0.021) 
and consequently no significant increase in the explained variance is noted from Model 1 to 
Model 2. Paradoxically, when the interactions between OCE and labor intensity are 
introduced into Model 3, a significant increase in the explained variance is noted. The 
meaning of the interaction involving the OCE term (b = 0.118) is that the strength of the 
relationship between OCE and sales per unit of labor costs varies according to labor intensity. 
The meaning of the interaction involving the quadratic OCE
 
term
 
(b = –0.122) is that the 
shape of the curvilinear relationship between OCE and sales per unit of labor costs varies 
according to labor intensity. We can corroborate that a firm’s labor intensity acts as an 
important moderator variable which affects both the strengths and shape of the curvilinear 
relationship between OCE and sales per unit of labor costs. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 
------------------------ 
To better understand these results, Table 4 shows the simple regression equations and 
Figure 1 and 2 represent the relationship between OCE and labor productivity. Figure 2 shows 
the simple regression equations characterizing this curvilinear relationship for low and high 
values of labor intensity. According to Aiken and West (1991), this involves dichotomizing 
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the labor intensity variable, choosing one standard deviation below (-27.886) and one above 
(27.886) the corresponding mean value. We can observe that OCE shows a predominantly 
positive concave downward curvilinear effect on sales per unit of labor costs at a high level of 
labor intensity, but a predominantly negative concave upward curvilinear effect at a low level 
of labor intensity. We can therefore confirm that the positive concave downward curvilinear 
relationship is more pronounced with a high level of labor intensity, as predicted in 
Hypothesis 2.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 
------------------------  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 
------------------------ 
Aiken and West (1991) explain that when the curve is concave upward it is expedient 
to calculate the minimum of the curve, in other words, the value of OCE at which labor 
productivity takes on its low value. When we analyze sales per labor costs in a low labor 
intensity context, the minimum is 0.767. When the curve is concave downward we can find 
the value of OCE implementation at which labor productivity reaches its highest value, the 
maximum of the curve. This optimal level is 0.907 when we analyze sales per labor costs in a 
high labor intensity context, and 5.318 when we select sales per employee. At these points of 
inflection (maximum and minimum) the effect of OCE investments on labor productivity is 
equal to zero and a change of sign in this effect (positive vs. negative) occurs. This is not 
appreciated in the figures since they fall outside the meaningful range of OCE values which, 
following Aiken and West (1991), are set at one standard deviation below (–0.682) and one 
above (0.682) the mean value. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study attempts to clarify whether investment in OCE actually produces greater 
firm performance. Some authors have recently begun to show some skepticism about this 
assertion, arguing that these investments can have harmful effects which are particularly 
significant for small firms. Recent empirical studies have lent support to this skepticism. 
Against this background, the presence of a curvilinear or nonlinear relationship between OCE 
and organizational outcomes provides a satisfactory solution to the growing debate among 
researchers who defend the positive effects of OCE on organizational outcomes and those 
who find no significant effect whatsoever, and still others who claim that OCE has a negative 
effect. The confirmation of a curvilinear relationship allows these divergent postures to be 
reconciled, since the fundamental cause of these discrepancies may lie in the different range 
or level of OCE in the samples of firms used in previous studies. The present research focuses 
on this possibility and undertakes an in-depth study of the nature of the relationship between 
OCE and two different measures of labor productivity in the small firm setting. Our approach 
allows us to highlight some basic theoretical implications and to provide an answer to a range 
of practical questions in human resource management.  
Our results support the thesis put forward by Becker et al. (1997), Chadwick (2007) or 
Chi and Lin (2010) that a nonlinear relationship may exist between human resource practices 
and organizational outcomes. Rather than taking a linear relationship between these two 
variables as an initial premise, traditionally the case in the human resource management 
literature, it should be considered as a relevant hypothesis that needs to be confirmed 
empirically. More specifically, as we have noted in our study, it would be advisable to 
introduce the OCE quadratic term in empirical studies as a factor to explain organizational 
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results. If this quadratic term had been omitted, nonlinearity would not have been detected 
even when it does exist (Aiken & West, 1991). 
On the other hand, as Becker et al. (1997) discuss, confirming a nonlinear relationship 
between OCE and organizational outcomes supports the contingent view of strategic human 
resource management. This contingent approach has been used to defend the notion that an 
investment in OCE is more effective in some contexts than in others (Chang & Huang 2005; 
Youndt et al., 1996). Although this perspective has normally been applied to examine how a 
competitive strategy moderates the effect of progressive human resources practices on 
organizational outcomes, Chang and Huang (2005), Guest et al. (2003) and Youndt et al. 
(1996) recommend using another series of firm variables that match human resource 
management more closely by examining the potential and complex interactions among them. 
This indication is fully justified in this research work since it demonstrates that the level of 
OCE and the labor intensity in a firm act as moderator variables.  
Our results confirm Hypothesis 1 when the ratio of sales per employee is taken as a 
dependent variable, that is, the higher the level of OCE in a firm, the lower the positive effect 
of OCE on sales per employee will be. Conversely, the second hypothesis is confirmed when 
we select the ratio of sales per labor costs as the dependent variable, that is, the higher the 
level of OCE and the lower the level of labor intensity, the lower the positive effect of OCE 
on sales per unit of labor costs will be. As Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Sels et al. (2006) 
point out, it is highly probable that these different results are due to the varying nature of 
these two labor productivity indicators. Although implementing OCE may possibly increase 
company income (sales per employee), it might also increase labor costs, with uncertain 
consequences for sales per unit of labor costs. In other words, there is a possibility that 
investment in OCE increases sales per employee without this necessarily leading to greater 
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sales per unit of labor costs. This situation, shown in the empirical studies of Cappelli and 
Neumark (2001) and Sels et al. (2006), is also seen in our research.  
Furthermore, a curvilinear relationship, not foreseen in our theoretical framework, 
emerged in the context of firms with a low level of labor intensity, that is, a predominantly 
negative concave upward curvilinear relationship between OCE and sales per unit of labor 
costs. This means that the labor costs in an initial phase of OCE implementation are 
particularly high and outweigh the benefits gained. It is only when a high level of OCE 
implementation is reached that benefits offset labor costs. Our results seem to support Youndt 
et al. (1996) when they argue that, in many cases, heavy investments in the firm’s plant and 
machinery to automate the production process (firms with low labor intensity) have in fact 
resulted in systems that require and promote low qualified employees, poor training 
opportunities and with lower employee remuneration (firms with a low OCE level). In these 
firm contexts, investments in OCE may have a negative effect on organizational outcomes.  
Implications for practice  
All these theoretical inferences have important consequences for practitioners. Firstly, 
and in line with Becker et al. (1997) and Chi and Lin (2010), the confirmation of a curvilinear 
relationship between OCE and organizational outcomes should prompt managers of small 
firms to not only take into account the benefits derived from OCE, but also their 
implementation costs, with a view to finding the optimum level of OCE. Secondly, the 
confirmation of a contingent view shows us that OCE is extremely idiosyncratic and its 
implementation must be carefully assessed in accordance with each firm’s individual 
circumstances. Heavy investment in training, a low number of temporary contracts, and high 
salaries are not practices that guarantee greater organizational outcomes for any type of firm 
(Boxall & Purcell, 2000; Orlitzky & Frenkel, 2005). Specifically, Godard and Delany (2000) 
indicate that excessive investment in and implementation of progressive human resource 
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practices in small firms may be counterproductive. These authors reflect that if OCE 
implementation in large firms was as beneficial as has always been claimed, we would also 
find these human resource practices widely employed in small firms. Yet the real business 
situation reveals a completely different picture: a fairly heterogeneous introduction. In the 
small firm setting, what Orlitzky and Frenkel (2005) argue appears to be confirmed, namely, 
that not all firms with large profits apply OCE.  
Thirdly, OCE always has a positive effect on both sales per employee and sales per 
unit of labor costs in small firms with high labor intensity. It is therefore clear that these firms 
should attempt to invest more in OCE, as this will increase their labor productivity. These 
results therefore coincide with previous studies in the small firm setting (e.g., Hayton, 2003; 
Rauch et al., 2005), which confirm that investments in employees’ abilities and motivation 
increases organizational outcomes. For small firms with low labor intensity, this is not such a 
clear-cut decision because conflicting objectives appear. Thus, while increased investment in 
OCE increases sales per employee, at the same time it reduces sales per unit of labor costs. 
The small firm’s strategic orientation in the product market may have a bearing on how to 
resolve this dilemma. If the small firm adopts an aggressive posture and its main priority is to 
increase its market share, even at the expense of becoming less efficient and obtaining lower 
profitability, it could opt to increase its investment in OCE. Conversely, if the small firm 
adopts a defensive posture in which its main priority is to maintain its market share as 
efficiently as possible, the most appropriate action would be to invest less in OCE. On the 
other hand, an underinvestment in OCE may also be considered as a temporary means of 
weathering severe economic downturns; however these firms should increase their investment 
in order to improve their market share and to remain viable in the long term.  
Finally, our quantitative perspective on measuring OCE enables investors to evaluate 
human resource management company decisions. If the human resource system can really 
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make a difference to firm performance, managers and investors should be given the means to 
understand it. If not, the habitual conditioning of cutting costs and short-term pressures could 
tempt them to ignore or distort human resource practices (d’Arcimoles, 1997; Godard, 2004). 
However, this option restricts the possible range of its human resource practices to a relatively 
short list of easily quantifiable indicators, thus omitting the more subjective aspects of work 
organization such as the social exchange between managers and employees. The ESEE does 
not include any qualitative indicators. This limitation is common in European databases of 
this type used in previous studies, such as the “French Company Personnel Report” utilized 
by d’Arcimoles (1997). On the other hand, because the ESEE centers on industrial firms, the 
results cannot therefore be generalized to service firms. As Guest et al. (2003) point out, the 
relationship between progressive human resource practices and organizational outcomes is 
different in these two sectors of business activity. Future lines of research could examine the 
potential existence of a curvilinear relationship in service firms. Unquestionably, future 
studies that examine this possibility will help us assess more accurately whether, or under 
what circumstances, implementing OCE is truly beneficial for firms.  
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TABLE 1 
 Distribution of firms by sectors of activity (N = 819) 
SIC CNAE Number Percentage 
20 and 21 DA. Food, drink and tobacco industry 104 12.7% 
22 and 23 DB. Textile and clothing industry 89 10.9% 
31 DC. Leather and footwear industry 33 4.0% 
24 and 25 DD. Timber and cork industry 34 4.2% 
26 and 27 DE. Paper industry; publishing, graphic arts and reproduction of engravings 70 8.5% 
28 DG. Chemical industry 28 3.4% 
30 DH. Rubber transformation and plastic materials industry 55 6.7% 
32 DI. Other mineral, non-metallic product industries 56 6.8% 
33 and 34 DJ. Primary metal industry and manufacturing of metal products 130 15.9% 
35 and 36 DK. Machinery and electrical equipment manufacturing industry 61 7.4% 
38 DL. Electrical, electronic and optical materials and equipment industry 57 7.0% 
37 DM. Manufacturing of transportation equipment industry 27 3.3% 
39 DN. Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 75 9.2% 
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TABLE 2 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Firm age 18.432 15.997 1        
2. Firm size (log) 1.440 0.258 0.123
**
 1       
3. Share capital held by other firms 14.090 32.603 0.109
**
 0.404
**
 1      
4. Innovation intensity 0.332 1.295 0.082
*
 0.113
**
 0.091
**
 1     
5. Labor intensity 5.130 27.886 0.042 -0.094
**
 -0.029 -0.017 1    
6. OCE 0.000 0.682 0.270
**
 0.173
**
 0.337
**
 0.154
**
 0.002 1   
7. Sales per employee (log) 11.340 0.738 0.169
**
 0.272
**
 0.383
**
 0.088
*
 -0.035 0.475
**
 1  
8. Sales per labor costs (log) 1.378 0.604 0.037 0.174
**
 0.225
**
 0.013 -0.046 0.105
**
 0.853
**
 1 
 Notes:    **  p < 0.01;  *   p < 0.05;  (bilateral significance) 
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TABLE 3 
Results of hierarchical regression analyses a 
Variables Sales per employee Sales per labor costs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm age 0.028 0.012 0.012 –0.017 –0.014 –0.013 
Firm size 0.115
**
 0.119
**
 0.127
**
 0.096
**
 0.095
**
 0.107
**
 
Share capital held by other firms 0.182
**
 0.174
**
 0.169
**
 0.155
**
 0.156
**
 0.153
**
 
Food, drink and tobacco industry 0.086
*
 0.080
*
 0.075
*
 0.160
**
 0.161
**
 0.152
**
 
Textile and clothing industry –0.153
**
 –0.152** –0.159** –0.059 –0.059 –0.070 
Leather and footwear industry 0.028 0.033 0.036 0.113
**
 0.112
**
 0.117
**
 
Timber and cork industry 0.033 0.030 0.034 0.072
*
 0.073
*
 0.080
*
 
Paper industry 0.003 –0.012 –0.015 0.001 0.004 –0.002 
Chemical industry 0.084
**
 0.076
*
 0.076
*
 0.100
**
 0.102
**
 0.101
**
 
Rubber transformation and plastic industry 0.010 0.002 –0.003 0.039 0.041 0.034 
Other mineral, non-metallic product industries 0.031 0.027 0.022 0.051 0.052 0.044 
Machinery and electrical equipment manufacturing industry –0.044 –0.055
+
 –0.062+ –0.093* –0.091* –0.095* 
Electrical, electronic, optical and equipment industry –0.036 –0.044 –0.049 –0.050 –0.048 –0.050 
Manufacturing of transportation equipment industry –0.005 –0.006 –0.010 –0.006 –0.005 –0.010 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries –0.044 –0.049 –0.054 –0.006 –0.005 –0.013 
Innovation intensity 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.009 
Labor intensity –0.003 –0.005 –0.040 –0.015 –0.015 0.047 
OCE 0.366
**
 0.432
**
 0.455
**
 0.062 0.050 0.072 
OCE squared  –0.114
**
 –0.108+  0.021 –0.065 
OCE x Labor intensity   0.088
*
   0.118
**
 
OCE squared x Labor intensity   –0.010   –0.122
+
 
   R
2
 (∆R2 for model) 0.345
**
  0.354
**
 (0.009)
 **
 0.358
**
 (0.004)
 
 0.131
**
 0.132
**
 (0.000)  0.147
**
 (0.015)
**
 
Notes:    Standardized regression coefficients.    **  p < 0.01;  *  p < 0.05;  + p < 0.10 (bilateral significance) 
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TABLE 4 
Simple regression equations of the effect of OCE (X) on labor productivity (Y)  
Sales per employee (Model 2) Sales per labor costs (Model 3) 
Y = –0.044**  X
2
 + 0.468
**
 X + 10.828 
High labor intensity: Y = –0.228+  X
2
 + 0.414
**
  X + 0.918 
Low labor intensity: Y = 0.187
*
  X
2
 - 0.287
*
  X + 0.975 
Notes:    **  p < 0.01;  *  p < 0.05;  + p < 0.10 (bilateral significance) 
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FIGURE 1 
Effect of OCE on sales per employee 
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FIGURE 2 
Effect of OCE on sales per unit of labor costs according to labor intensity 
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